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Abstract—This paper presents CARE, an autonomous email
reputation system based on inter-domain collaboration. Within
the framework of CARE, each domain independently builds its
reputation database based on both the local email history and the
information exchanged with other collaborating domains. CARE
examines the trustworthiness of the email histories obtained from
collaborators by correlating them with the local email history. To
validate the efﬁcacy of CARE, we have analyzed real email logs,
conducted a DNS-based estimation experiment, and performed a
series of simulations. Our experimental results show that CARE
can effectively improve the reliability and performance of email
systems.
I. INTRODUCTION
An email reputation system, which provides a goodness
measure (quantitative or qualitative) of email server behavior,
is in great demand given the swarm of spam over the Internet.
Email reputation systems can assist email servers in deciding
the action for an incoming message: directly drop/accept or
apply spam ﬁlters. A well-functioned reputation system can
effectively improve the performance and reliability of email
service by saving cost on spam ﬁltering and ensuring rejection
of unwanted messages and acceptance of wanted messages.
Existing email reputation systems can be roughly classiﬁed
into two categories based on their purposes: the systems only
for spam rejection and the systems for both nonspam accep-
tance and spam rejection. A variety of DNS-based blacklists
(DNSBLs) such as [1], [2] exemplify the former, while the
Gmail reputation service [3] illustrates the latter. Compared
to the reputation systems for spam rejection, the reputation
systems for nonspam acceptance and spam rejection are much
preferred as they also provide ratings for legitimate email
senders.
Incorporating the reputation of legitimate email senders
can effectively improve the reliable delivery of legitimate
email. Nowadays spam ﬁlters are ubiquitously deployed to
ﬁght spam. Due to its computational intensiveness, spam
ﬁltering could become a processing bottleneck when an inﬂux
of email occurs and result in loss of nonspam messages.
Moreover, aggressive spam ﬁlters may cause email loss. A
recent study on email loss [4] reveals that the email accounts
with spam ﬁlter lost signiﬁcantly more legitimate messages
than the email accounts with no spam ﬁlter1. Many anecdotal
reports including the loss of email submissions discussed in
the “end2end” mail-list [5] indicate the existence of email loss
due to spam ﬁltering. The email delivery crises emerging in
aforementioned situations can be much relieved by a reputation
system that rates legitimate email senders.
However, existing reputation systems that rate both spam
senders and nonspam senders suffer either from being isolated
or from relying on a central authority. A reputation system
using only local email history is constrained by its scope
of communications. Its effectiveness will be degraded when
new senders continuously appear, and the constant appearance
of new senders has been observed in the email logs of
two universities we studied. Considering the service scale,
ordinary email service providers can rarely achieve the same
success as the Gmail [3] if their reputation systems only use
local information. RepuScore [6] is another email reputation
framework that rate both nonspam senders and spam senders.
However, it requires a hierarchical architecture and a central
authority to maintain the reputation database, which poses a
challenge to the large-scale trust management and deployment.
In this paper we present CARE, a Collaboration-based
Autonomous email REputation system rating both spam do-
mains and nonspam domains. Working at domain level, CARE
enables a domain to build its reputation database, including
both frequently contacted and unacquainted email sending
domains, by (1) locally recording email sending behavior of
remote domains and (2) exchanging the local information with
other collaborating domains. CARE examines the trustworthi-
ness of email histories obtained from collaborators by correlat-
ing them with local email history, and integrates the local and
remote information to derive the reputation of remote domains.
We demonstrate the effectiveness of domain collaboration on
improving the coverage of CARE by comparing two email log
traces from two universities, conducting a large experiment
of DNS snooping to study the collaboration among multiple
domains, and performing extensive simulations in a large-scale
environment.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II brieﬂy overviews related work in email reputation. Section
1The messages are neither in the inbox nor in the spam folder.2
III presents the motivation of this work. Section IV details
the design of CARE. Section V validates the effectiveness of
CARE. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Email reputation systems rate email sending entities based
on the history of their sending behaviors. The entity can be
email address, IP address, or domain name. Some reputation
systems use qualitative measures (e.g., good or bad) while
others use quantitative measures (e.g., spam score is 58). A
brief taxonomy of email reputation systems is given in [7].
Address based reputation systems are very popular. Email
address based whitelists and blacklists, e.g., DOEmail[8], are
commonly used by individuals. To defeat email address spoof-
ing, many sender authentication schemes have been proposed,
in which SPF (Sender Policy Framework) [9] and DKIM
(DomainKeys Identiﬁed Mail) [10] are the most noticeable.
SPF and DKIM can help identify the sending party but cannot
determine its legitimacy as spammers also embrace these
schemes [3], [11]. As one type of IP-address-based blacklists,
DNSBLs (e.g., [1], [2]) disseminate blacklists through DNS
and are widely used. However, the effectiveness of DNSBLs
has been questioned [12], [13], [14], [15]. Besides DNSBLs,
other types of IP-address-based reputation systems such as
[16] also exist. These systems usually are commercial and
use proprietary techniques for reputation maintenance and
dissemination.
The Gmail reputation system [3] rates domains instead of
IP addresses. It uses only local information and identiﬁes the
sending domain using both heuristics and SPF and DKIM.
Singaraju et al. [6] proposed a collaborative email reputation
framework called RepuScore, which also rates domains.
Leiba et al. [17] presented an algorithm to derive the reputa-
tion of email domains and IP addresses by analyzing the SMTP
sending paths (in the message header) of known legitimate
messages and spam messages. Golbeck et al. [18] proposed
an algorithm to infer the relative reputation ratings of email
contacts based on the exchange of reputation values. Chirita
et al. [19] developed a reputation scheme called MailRank,
which can compute a global reputation score as well as a
personalized score for each email address. Both [18] and [19]
assume the existence of global email social networks and
compute reputation scores in a centralized manner.
Collaboration has been applied into the spam signature
generation and email address whitelist population. Vipul’s
razor [20] maintains a collaborative network through which
the signatures of human-identiﬁed spam are submitted and
distributed. To expand whitelists in an automatic manner,
LOAF [21], FOAF [22], and RE: [23] have been developed.
These systems leverage the social connections to ﬁnd indirect
relations between senders and recipients.
III. MOTIVATION
As demonstrated by [24] and [25], local email histories can
be used to enhance the quality of email service. However,
they also reveal that it is impossible to cover all incoming
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Fig. 1. Number of newly-appeared senders per day
email messages merely based on local history. In other words,
there are always messages from unseen sources. Unfortunately,
the dynamics of such messages, which directly affect the
performance of a local-history-based reputation system, have
not yet been studied. This motivated our following study on
the dynamics of incoming email.
We collected 151-day email logs for inbound messages
from our campus email servers. The logs are daily-based and
span from 2007/11/01 to 2008/03/31 with only one daily log
missing. For each inbound message, we logged the time of
message arrival, the IP address and domain name (if any)
of the sending server, and the score (between 0 and 300,
the bigger, the more likely to be spam) given by the spam
ﬁlter. We removed those records without valid fully qualiﬁed
domain names (FQDN), since their corresponding messages
are almost certainly spam. As original logs do not contain the
name of the domain in which each sending server resides, we
derived the domain information using dig and added it into
the logs. We observed that a signiﬁcant number of newly-
appeared (never recorded by any previous logs) servers and
domains consistently show up in daily logs, even after 100
days. The average numbers of newly-appeared servers and
domains per day are 27,733 and 1,152, respectively. More
importantly, this observation also holds for those servers and
domains that mostly send legitimate email.
We use metric “good-ratio” to measure sending behav-
ior of a server (and domain). The good-ratio of a sending
server/domain is computed by dividing the number of nonspam
messages over the number of total messages sent from the3
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Fig. 2. CDF of good-ratio for spam and nonspam (or good) email
server/domain across all logs. Good-ratio “1” means always
sending nonspam email and good-ratio “0” means always
sending spam. We classify the messages with scores no
greater than 10 (The default threshold is 50) as nonspam
and the rest as spam. This classiﬁcation results in around
1.8% false negatives (i.e., uncaught spam) and zero false
positive (i.e., misclassiﬁed nonspam) in one of campus email
archives, which contains 1,800 manually veriﬁed spam mes-
sages. We further reduce false negatives by applying a few
well-established heuristics, such as identifying sending servers
with dynamically-allocated IP addresses by domain name.
Despite that false positives and false negatives may still exist
after conservative classiﬁcation and rectiﬁcation, we believe
that the misclassiﬁcation is minor and should not affect our
measurement results.
Figure 1 illustrates the dynamics of the numbers of the
newly-appeared servers and domains whose good-ratios are
no less than 0.4 in daily logs. The servers (domains) are
further divided into two groups; one group with good-ratio in
[0.4, 0.8) and the other with good-ratio in [0.8, 1]. In Figure
1, we can see that the number of newly-appeared servers
(domains) per day is not negligible. For example, even after
100 days, newly-appeared servers with good-ratio over 0.8
per day are still counted by thousands. Compared to newly-
appeared servers per day, newly-appeared domains with high
good-ratios per day are counted by hundreds, still too many
to be ignored.
These measurement results suggest that using only local
history information may not be sufﬁcient for building a high-
quality reputation system. Intuitively, the coverage of senders
can be improved through collaboration, as an email sender
that is new to one receiver may be old to others. Naturally,
the peers that have frequent email communications and behave
consistently well become candidates of collaborator. As shown
in a recent spam study [25], there exist good email servers
from which most of email is nonspam for most of time.
However, that analysis is based on the data from one vantage
point and does not study the sender behavior at the domain
level. Therefore, we use our email logs to verify if their
observation holds here and up to the domain level.
Taking spam (nonspam) messages from the servers with
valid domain names in all logs as a whole, we examine
the proportion of spam (nonspam) contributed by the servers
with a speciﬁc good-ratio. we plot the CDFs (i.e., cumulative
distribution functions) of good-ratio for spam and nonspam
at host level in Figure 2 (a). The curve at the left top shows
the CDF for spam while the curve at the right bottom shows
the CDF for nonspam. The CDFs at the domain level are
shown in Figure 2 (b). We also examined the CDFs with
different time windows (i.e., number of days) and time ranges
(i.e., starting and ending days) and found that those CDFs
are very similar to those shown in Figure 2. In general, our
results conform to the ﬁndings in [25]. The servers with
high good-ratios send the majority of nonspam email and the
servers with low good-ratios send the most of spam, which
makes the use of reputation system very helpful. For instance,
the servers with good-ratios no smaller than 0.8 send over
80% of total nonspam email but less than 1% of total spam.
Hence, whitelisting these servers would save a great deal
of ﬁltering resources and improve the delivery of legitimate
email. Moreover, the server-level observations also apply at
the domain level. The curve shapes in Figure 2 (b) are similar
to those in Figure 2 (a), indicating that well-behaved domains
do exist.
Based on the measurement results, we conclude that (1)
email senders can be rated by their long-term behaviors; (2)
local observation may not sufﬁce for building a high-quality
reputation system. These two factors are instrumental to the
design of CARE.
IV. SYSTEM DESIGN
CARE is designed to be an autonomous system. Each
domain equipped with CARE independently determines col-
laborating domains, exchanges information with collaborating
domains, and derives reputation scores of remote domains. In-
formation exchange occurs between two domains that mutually
agree on collaboration. In case no collaboration is available,
the system can continue functioning by using only local
email history information. The autonomy eases incremental
deployment of CARE.
As a reputation system, CARE operates collaboratively
with other anti-spam techniques. A typical use of CARE
is functioning as a preprocessor of a content-based spam
ﬁlter. Messages from domains with sufﬁciently high reputation
scores are directly accepted while messages from domains4
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Fig. 3. Architecture of CARE system
with very low reputation scores are directly rejected. For the
rest of email, those messages from domains with no reputation
are directly passed to the ﬁlter and all the others are marked
with their reputation scores before passing.
The architecture of CARE is shown in Figure 3. The local
email history module takes the log of local email servers as
input and derives the local Database of Email History (DEH).
The information of local DEH is used in both information
exchange and reputation derivation. In information exchange,
the collaborating domains are determined based on their
behaviors recorded by local DEH. In reputation derivation,
local DEH involves in both calculating reputation scores
and assessing the trustworthiness of remote information from
collaborating domains. Through the communication module, a
CARE system exchanges information with other collaborating
systems via Simple Email Reputation Protocol (SERP). To
provide ﬂexibility in deciding collaborating domains, a policy
module is incorporated allowing system administrators to
apply their admission control policies. For example, local
domain might be forbidden to exchange information with some
remote domains due to certain policy, although those domains
are regarded as collaborating candidates by the CARE system.
Using both local DEH and remote DEHs, reputation scores
of email sending domains are computed and stored into the
reputation database.
In this section, we ﬁrst highlight the rating issues in CARE.
Then, we describe how to build the local email history and
reputation database. After that, we detail the communication
module and SERP protocol.
A. Rating Issues
CARE uses domain as the reputation identity, following
Gmail reputation service [3] and RepuScore [6]. Rating do-
main is preferred to rating server (IP address), due to the
following reasons. First, domain is easier to be authenticated
than IP address, as email authentication schemes such as SPF
and DKIM have become popular. Second, email sending poli-
cies are usually applied at domain level for nonspam domains
and rating domain can provide better scalability. Third, an IP
address can be used by multiple entities simultaneously, while
a domain represents only one entity at any time. Last but not
least, legitimate email servers are usually placed in a separate
subdomain in a large ISP and can be easily distinguished from
the subdomain where a spam botnet resides.
CARE does not differentiate email relaying servers from
email originating servers in rating. If an email server not only
sends email for its own domain, but also relays email for other
domains, all relayed messages will be counted onto the relay
domain. “No open-relay” has been a rule for email server
administration and well followed by decent email service
providers.
B. Local Email History
Local email history contains the information of both in-
bound and outbound email transmissions occurred locally. If
multiple email servers are used in the local domain, the local
email history is the integration of the information recorded
by all those servers. Local email history records the basic
information of email transmissions such as email transfer time,
spam or not, source and destination at host and domain levels.
This information usually can be directly extracted from email
log. The domain of a remote host can be easily retrieved,
e.g., by using DNS utility “dig”. Local email history does
not include the information of the messages whose sending
domains cannot be identiﬁed. In general, legitimate email
servers of an ISP can be distinguished from spam bots residing
inside the same ISP by domain name, because legitimate
email servers are usually placed in a separate domain for
management and security reasons. For instance, the broadband
host “ip70-161-245-78.hr.hr.cox.net” is in domain “hr.cox.net”
while the legitimate email server “smtp.west.cox.net” is in
domain “west.cox.net.” Email authentication schemes such as
SPF and DKIM can further enhance the accuracy of domain
identiﬁcation as the binding between an email server and its
domain is explicitly expressed by special DNS records. The
local email history can be updated either online or ofﬂine.
A CARE system also maintains a special database called
Database of Email History (DEH), which is derived from the
local email history and used in information sharing. Each
sending domain has a record (X, TM, GM, AD)i nt h e
database. A record proﬁles the email sending behavior of a
domain in the past W days. W is a tunable parameter and
decided by system administrator. X is the name of sending
domain. TM and GM are the numbers of total messages
and good (i.e., nonspam) messages from X, respectively. AD
is the number of the active days, in each of which, at least
one message from X is received. The database is updated
periodically, e.g., once per day, and the history information
beyond W days could be removed to save disk space.
C. Reputation Database
We derive a domain’s reputation by combining both local
DEH and remote DEHs collected from collaborating domains.
Initially, only local database is available. Under this circum-
stance, the reputation derivation is simpliﬁed into computing
the good-ratio of each domain in the local database. After
exchanging information with collaborating domains, we also
use remote databases in derivation of domain reputation.
However, the information from collaborating domains may
not be fully trusted, because the authenticity of information
is self-warranted. Therefore, we introduce a trustworthiness
score for each remote database. In the absence of a central5
Algorithm 1 Computing Domain Reputation
1: Input: DEHI and all collected remote DEHRs.
2: Output: reputation score for every sender in DEHI and
DEHRs.
3: for each remote DEHR do
4: compute trustworthiness score θR.
5: end for
6: for each sender X in DEHI and those DEHRs that contain
it do
7: compute the reputation score of X.
8: end for
authority, we rely on the local information to assess the trust-
worthiness of a remote database. Speciﬁcally, we examine the
correlation between the local database and remote database on
sending domains in common, and use the correlation result to
compute the trustworthiness score of that database. The remote
databases with high trustworthiness scores are deemed reliable.
A domain’s reputation score is the weighted average of good-
ratios derived from the local and remote databases, and the
weight for each remote database is set as the trustworthiness
score of that database.
Algorithm 1 describes the general process of computing
domain reputation. The notations used in the algorithm and the
rest of the section are summarized in Table I. In general, the
subscript of a symbol represents a history recording domain;
it can also represent the domain’s DEH when the context is
clear. We use R for a generic collaborating domain and I
for the local domain. The superscript of a symbol represents
an email sending domain (seen by either local domain or a
collaborating domain). For clarity, a collaborating domain with
which we exchange information is termed as a collaborator,
while a domain logged in either the local history or a remote
history is termed as a sender.
TABLE I
SUMMARY OF NOTATIONS
DEH Database of Email History
SMD Set of Major Domains, for history correlation
W History Window
X Domain X
KU(X) public key of domain X
KI(X) private key of domain X
GMX
D # of good messages from X received by D
TMX
D # of total messages from X received by D
ADX
D # of active days X sending email to D
dgX
D good-ratio of X according to DEHD
dsX
D domain score of X according to DEHD
drX domain reputation of X
γR supporting factor of DEHR for computing θR
ωR correlation coefﬁcient of DEHR for computing θR
θR trustworthiness score (weight) of DEHR
β threshold used in constructing SMD
δ threshold used in computing γR
The process of computing domain reputation consists of
two steps. In the ﬁrst step (lines 3–5) we compute the
trustworthiness score of each remote database DEHR, and in
the second step (lines 6–8) we compute the reputation score
of each sender recorded by either the local database or remote
databases.
To compute the trustworthiness score of remote database
DEHR, we ﬁrst derive the Set of Major Domains (SMD)o f
that database. SMD contains those domains that behave well
and stay active. Such a well-behaved domain is indicated by
a high domain score. The domain score is deﬁned as ds =
GM
TM × AD
W . dsX
R stands for the domain score of sender X in
database DEHR and can be easily computed from the record
of X in DEHR. Senders with sufﬁciently high domain scores
are added into SMD, that is, SMD = {X : dsX ≥ β}, where
β is the threshold decided locally. A high value of β implies a
high good-ratio (we deﬁne the good-ratio as dg = GM
TM) and a
high ratio of active days (AD
W ). By setting β to an appropriate
value, we can ensure that the majority of domains in SMD are
legitimate.
Then, we compute the intersection set (denoted by INT) be-
tween local SMD (SMDI) and R’s SMD (SMDR)f o rr e m o t e
database DEHR. Formally, INTR = SMDI ∩SMDR.W ea l s o
compute supporting factor γR from INTR. By deﬁnition,
γR =
min(||INTR||,δ)
δ
, (1)
where ||S|| represents the cardinality of set S, and δ is a
pre-deﬁned system parameter. The rationale behind computing
SMD and INT is to ﬁnd a reliable common base for correlation
computing. In other words, the sending domains in common
for correlation computing (i.e., the set of domains represented
by INT) are expected to manifest consistent sending behaviors
to receiving domains including the local domain I and remote
domain R. Legitimate email service providers usually present
this characteristic. Computing γ is to take the size of common
base into consideration.
After that, we compute the correlation coefﬁcient of DEHR
(denoted by ωR)f r o mINTR based on city block distance
(also called Manhattan distance or taxicab distance). For the
domains in INTR, we ﬁrst derive their good-ratio vectors in
DEHI and DEHR (denoted as VI and VR respectively). With
INTR = {X1...Xn}, VI =[ dgX1
I ...dgXn
I ] and VR =
[dgX1
R ...dgXn
R ]. Then, the city block distance between VI
and VR, denoted as dist(VI,VR), is obtained by summing
up the differences of good-ratios in DEHI and DEHR for each
domain in INTR. Formally,
dist(VI,VR)=
n 
i=1
|dgXi
R − dgXi
I |. (2)
We get the correlation coefﬁcient ωR by normalizing
dist(VI,VR) into [0,1], that is,
ωR =1−
dist(VI,VR)
||INTR||
. (3)
We derive the trustworthiness score of DEHR, θR,b y
multiplying DEHR’s supporting factor γR and its correlation
coefﬁcient ωR. Formally,
θR = γR·ωR =
min(||INTR||,δ)
δ
·(1−
dist(VI,VR)
||INTR||
). (4)6

	


	




 !" !#$
%&"'&(%!	
)*+ +
#!+,-./0+1
	.2$	$
304

%&"'&(%!	
)*+ +#!+
,5
-'5.-+1


627	2849	:;<
=32849	:;<
-&&">?
@	!"&A
	 	
  2
Fig. 4. Procedure of a successful mutual agreement establishment via SERP
We also incorporate a list of trusted collaborators into
CARE. Administrators can add their trusted collaborating
domains into the list or remove any domain from it. The weight
of each domain in the list, that is, θ, is 1. This offsets the
potential inaccuracy in computing the trustworthiness score,
since it is possible that a collaborating domain’s view is
different from the local view on the same sending domain.
Finally, for each domain X we derive its reputation score
drX by computing the weighted average of X’s good-ratios
(dgX) from the DEHs that record X.W eu s eD to represent
a generic domain whose DEH contains a record for X.T h e
weight for remote database DEHR, θR,i si n[0,1] and the
weight for the local database DEHI, θI, is always 1. Formally,
the reputation score of domain X is deﬁned as
drX =

D∈Q θD · dgX
D 
D∈Q θD
, (5)
where Q = {D : X∈DEHD}. Note that the local good-ratio
dgX
I can be 0. In this case, sender X has not been recorded by
the local domain. By using the weighted average, the sending
domains recorded by both the local domain and collaborators
are assessed from a broader view, while the sending domains
recorded only by the local domain are not affected.
Due to the space limit, we give a brief analysis of our
reputation mechanism on attack-resistance. The reputation
derivation of CARE makes it difﬁcult for a spammer to
gain a high reputation score, because a high score requires
consistently good behavior recorded by both local domain and
collaborators. A spammer could deliberately present different
behaviors to the local domain and a collaborator in order to
lower the trustworthiness score of that collaborator. However,
this type of pollution also requires the spammer to stay long
and behave well.
D. Simple Email Reputation Protocol (SERP)
CARE systems communicate with one another via SERP.
Through SERP, a CARE system can transfer DEH as well as
other messages to its counterpart. SERP adopts a DNS-based
authentication scheme, borrowing the idea of DNS-based
email authentication schemes. The DNS-based authentication
is lightweight, easy to install, and incrementally deployable.
SERP requires every deployment domain (e.g., example.com)
to publish a special TXT resource record2 in its care DNS
subdomain ( care.example.com in this example). The record
must specify the domain name (or IP address) of the host on
which CARE is serviced and the associated public key. By
doing so, a remote CARE host can be authenticated by ﬁrst
querying the TXT DNS record under the care subdomain of
the domain where the host resides, and then checking if the
domain name (or IP address) of the host is listed in that record.
Among all domains that have direct email communication
with the local domain, CARE selects those domains that
behave consistently well for collaboration. These domains
can be easily decided by examining the local email history.
Apparently, they also must have a valid TXT DNS record
for CARE. Each CARE system maintains a list of remote
domains satisfying these requirements and uses it for selecting
collaborating domains.
To collaborate, two domains are required to reach a mutual
agreement on information exchange before sharing DEHs.
With the agreement, the two domains will play dual roles of
service requester and provider.
Figure 4 illustrates the procedure of establishing a success-
ful mutual agreement via SERP. In the ﬁgure, the CARE hosts
in domain L.net (L for short) and R.net are X.L.net (X for
short) and Y.R.net, respectively. Both domains have published
their CARE DNS records. Since every CARE system keeps
a list of collaborating domains, by periodically querying the
CARE DNS records of those domains, each system can readily
know the positions of CARE hosts inside those domains. The
activity of periodic DNS query is shown as step (0) in Figure
4. After X successfully resolves the domain name of Y, it
sends a request to Y for establishing a TCP connection. When
Y receives this request, by checking its list of collaborating
domains, it can instantly decide how to react: accepting the
2In case DNS SRV resource record[26] is chosen to publish CARE service,
a separate DNS TXT record is still needed for carrying public key and CARE
host information.7
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Fig. 5. Percentage of newly-appeared IP addresses that have been recorded
by the other university over all newly-appeared IP addresses in daily logs
request if the remote host is in the list or rejecting the
request otherwise. In this example, Y accepts the request. The
TCP handshaking process is marked as step (1) in Figure 4.
Semantically, neither step (0) nor step (1) is part of SERP.
However, SERP needs step (0) for authentication and step (1)
for a reliable data connection and authorization.
After the TCP connection is established, host Y sends a
greeting message to the requesting host X (step (2)), indicating
its identity. After receiving the greeting message, X issues
command “HELO” (step (3)), followed by the domain name
of X and a certiﬁcate (CertL→R) encrypted by the public key
of domain R (i.e., KU(R)). The certiﬁcate CertL→R means
that domain L allows domain R to access L’s DEH.I ti s
composed by concatenating message M and its signature, that
is, CertL→R = M||EKI(L)[H(M)], where H(M) is the hash
value of M and KI(L) is the private key of domain L. Message
M contains: certiﬁcate issuer L and recipient R, certiﬁcate
starting and expiration times, and the updating interval of
L’s DEH. The communication proceeds if the certiﬁcate is
accepted by Y. Echoing the offer of X, Y responds by sending
its certiﬁcate CertR→L back to X (step (4)). After a successful
exchange, X sends command “QUIT” (step (5)), indicating
completion of the mutual agreement. The TCP connection is
torn down (step (7)) as soon as Y acknowledges the “QUIT”
command (step (6)). The above procedure will be repeated
once either of the certiﬁcates expires.
After mutual agreement, two domains can exchange their
DEHs with each other. The data exchange procedure is similar
to the agreement establishing procedure. The data exchange
can be optimized since DEH is usually updated gradually.
We can make a snapshot of DEH as the reference base and
generate a difference ﬁle for each update to DEH. Then,
we just transfer the appropriate difference ﬁle(s) instead of
a whole DEH, reducing the total bytes of data transmission.
V. SYSTEM EVALUATION
Our evaluations focus on the potential beneﬁt of using
CARE. Speciﬁcally, we are interested in the increase of
coverage brought by collaboration, that is, the reduction of
the number of newly-appeared sending domains thanks to
collaboration. We have analyzed real email logs, conducted
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Fig. 6. Number of DNS cache hits for 25 .edu domains
a DNS-based estimation experiment, and performed extensive
simulations to validate the effectiveness of CARE on improv-
ing the coverage.
A. Log-based Experiment
We ﬁrst collected two-month email logs from two univer-
sities recorded in the same time period. All email logs are
daily based and record the source IP addresses (no domain
information) and spam information for inbound messages.
For newly-appeared IP addresses in the daily logs of each
university, we examine how many of them have already been
recorded by the other university and calculate the percent-
age. The dynamics of the percentage in the daily logs are
shown in Figure 5, which demonstrates the effectiveness of
collaboration. The curve for university 1 shows that about 16%
to 20% of the newly-appeared IP addresses in university 1’s
daily logs have already been recorded in university 2’s logs.
For university 2, the percentage reduces to 5% but is stable.
The difference of percentage for two universities may be
attributed to the difference of total IP addresses in their email
logs. On average, university 1 records about 42 thousand IP
addresses daily, while university 2 observes about 87 thousand
IP addresses per day. However, the stability of both curves
implies the stable gain from collaboration in the long run.
B. DNS-based Experiment
Results from the log comparison are encouraging. How-
ever, we cannot obtain more email logs for comprehensively
evaluating CARE. We conducted a DNS-based experiment to
estimate the potential beneﬁt that could be achieved by multi-
domain collaboration. As an email sending server usually
sends a DNS MX query to obtain the location of receiving
server before launching an SMTP transaction, we can infer
whether email has been sent to a given domain by snooping
(using iterative mode) the DNS cache of the sending server.
If the MX record of the receiving domain can be found in
the DNS cache, it is highly likely that email communication
between the two domains has occurred recently. Clearly, the
number of cache hits by DNS snooping may not accurately
reﬂect real email communications. Nevertheless, DNS snoop-
ing provides an efﬁcient way of estimating the gain of multi-
domain collaboration and the derived result can serve as a
lower bound.8
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Fig. 7. Percentage of newly-appeared nonspam domains that are covered after using CARE in each day
We randomly selected 25 .edu domains from the logs used
in Section III as collaborating domains, and randomly selected
50,000 inactive domains as DNS snooping target domains.
Each of these snooped domains sent less than ﬁve messages in
total in the logs, and none of them had sent any messages in the
past month before snooping. We use these inactive domains as
“ongoing” and “new” sending domains to study how many of
them can be covered by our collaborators. After DNS probing
test, we found that 36,646 out of 50,000 domains can be
snooped. Then, we probed the DNS servers of each of these
domains to ﬁnd out how many MX records of the selected 25
.edu domains were in the DNS cache.
We count cache hits of each .edu domain and show the
numbers of cache hits for all 25 .edu domains in ascending
order in Figure 6. From the ﬁgure, we can see a clear diversity
on the number of probed domains with cache hit among
different .edu domains. Some .edu domains can be hit in DNS
caches of more than 8,000 inactive domains, while some other
.edu domains have less than 1,000 hits. For a .edu domain, a
hit in the DNS cache of an inactive domain means that the .edu
domain received email from the inactive domain and thus had
this domain in its local email history. Therefore, we can beneﬁt
more by collaborating with the .edu domains that have more
cache hits. Overall, the total number of cache hits for 25 .edu
domains is 12,660, indicating that the email histories from 25
collaborating .edu domains can cover at least 34.6% of newly-
appeared domains. The gain from multi-domain collaboration
could be bigger with more collaborators and more types (e.g.,
.com) of collaborators. In addition, we probed all the inactive
domains within one day. This implies that all 36,646 domains
appeared in the same day, which, however, is unlike to happen
in practice according to our measurement results. Thus, the
beneﬁt could be even higher in reality.
C. Simulation
We applied simulation to further study the dynamic charac-
teristics of CARE. We implemented a CARE simulator with
full CARE functionality. The simulator is driven by the conﬁg-
uration of email domains (1,200 nonspam domains and 10,000
spam domains) and the daily traces of email communications
among those domains (60 days). Both spam and nonspam
domains are dynamically born in the trace. Nonspam domains
stay until the end of trace, while spam domains only stay
for a short random period. Spam domains always send spam
to nonspam domains, while nonspam domains send to one
another both nonspam and spam messages. We use three types
of network topologies (power-law, small world, and random
graph) for nonspam domains. We readily acknowledge that the
generated traces may not be representative, since there is no
a priori knowledge on the topology and dynamics of email
domains. However, the emphasis here is on the effectiveness
of CARE with no assumption on network and communication
patterns.
The simulator ﬁrst randomly picks a given percentage
of nonspam domains as CARE domains using the domain
conﬁguration, and then starts simulation using the daily traces.
In each day, the simulator ﬁrst does the message receiving and
history recording driven by the trace records, then updates
the reputation database of each CARE domain. In simulation,
CARE is used as the preprocessor of a spam ﬁlter. The spam
ﬁlter has ﬁxed false positive rate and false negative rate,
0.01 and 0.05, respectively. Messages from a domain with
reputation score 0.8 or higher are regarded as nonspam and
messages from a domain with reputation score 0.1 or less
are regarded as spam. If the reputation score cannot ensure
acceptance or rejection, CARE tags the message with its
reputation score and passes it to the ﬁlter. All processing
results are logged into the database of email history to compute
reputation. All CARE domains use the same parameter setting
(history window W =3 0 , β =0 .3, and δ =3 ).
We ﬁrst investigate how CARE improves domain coverage
through collaboration. Figure 7 shows the dynamics of per-
centage of newly-appeared nonspam domains that are covered
after using CARE in each day. The results are displayed
from day 20 because of history accumulation. The “net1,”
“net2,” and “net3” stand for power-law topology, small world
topology, and random graph topology, respectively. To illus-
trate the effect of increasing CARE deployment ratio on the
coverage, we set the percentage of the nonspam domains that
use CARE as 10%, 20%, and 30% in the simulation, and
display their results in Figure 7’s (a), (b), and (c) respectively.
For each given combination of network setting and CARE
domain percentage, we run ten trials and use the average as
the result.
Figure 7 clearly demonstrates the effectiveness of CARE9
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Fig. 8. Percentage of more nonspam messages being directly accepted after using CARE in each day
collaboration on improving the coverage of nonspam domains.
Moreover, by comparing (a), (b), and (c) of Figure 7, we
can see that the increase of percentage of CARE deployment
renders the growth of percentage of domains being covered.
Increased coverage indicates that more nonspam messages
can have reputation scores and be protected from being
dropped by spam ﬁlter. We compare the number of the
nonspam messages that are directly accepted under CARE
collaboration to that using only local information and ﬁnd that
CARE does increase the number of directly accepted nonspam
messages. Figure 8 shows the percentage of increase in terms
of nonspam messages being directly accepted in each day. We
can see that more nonspam messages are accepted under all
three different network topologies. The percentage of increase
keeps growing with time in all simulation environments. This
indicates that the use of CARE can prevent considerably more
nonspam messages from being lost. It is also notable from
Figure 8 that more CARE deployments (10% vs. 20%) result
in more nonspam messages being directly accepted.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we have presented the motivation, design,
and evaluation of CARE, a collaboration-based autonomous
email reputation system. CARE is a generic email reputation
system in that it rates both spam and nonspam domains in an
autonomous manner. Using CARE, each domain derives the
reputation scores of email sending domains by sharing its local
observations with those domains that manifest consistently
good behavior. In the evaluation of CARE, we used real email
log traces from two universities to quantify the beneﬁts of col-
laboration between two domains and conducted a large DNS
snooping experiment to estimate the potential gain brought by
multi-domain collaboration. Moreover, we performed exten-
sive simulations to further investigate CARE in a large-scale
environment. Our experimental results evidently demonstrate
the effectiveness of CARE.
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